[PSA] Malware distributed on the AUR


in reply to Mark

most of the the Arch cult forget to mention that


The "Arch cult's" holy book, the ArchWiki, states the following pretty clearly:

Warning: AUR packages are user-produced content. These PKGBUILDs are completely unofficial and have not been thoroughly vetted. Any use of the provided files is at your own risk.


Mention of one's use of the AUR for their needs doesn't need to come with a disclaimer.
People who don't read or don't use their brain are going to keep not doing so, regardless.

This entry was edited (9 months ago)
in reply to DirkMcCallahan

That is sound advice, the AUR is most definitely not a trusted source though. For the normal arch repos the people who put the stuff there are known, they work for the project, you're as likely to get malware from one of those as you are to read an article bashing gamespot in gamespot, the people in charge of putting the packages there are the ones with more vested interest in things working so they won't knowingly introduce malicious code (plus it's a handful of people who know each other by first name).

The AUR is a different story, because anyone can put stuff there it's very easy to have malicious code end up there. It doesn't happen that often because most of the time it's fairly obvious and it gets flagged straight away, plus if people start doing that people will migrate away from the AUR, so it's a high risk low reward situation. But as more and more people start to use Arch derivatives that come with the AUR enabled without understanding any of this it becomes a more rewarding thing to exploit.

in reply to DirkMcCallahan

The AUR, key words “user repository” is a specific weak point. It doesn’t have the same level of oversight that the main arch repo has. Stick to main repos and verified flatpaks and it’s very unlikely that you’d ever be compromised.

Linux isn’t perfect, but it’s certainly better than windows where you just download executables willy nilly to install your software.

in reply to Fecundpossum

BTW python's package index has roughly the same problem - but a far less technical, experienced and critical user base. NPM has this problem since years.

Expect these problems to rise with every percent more of new Linux users which never learned the difference between opening / viewing untrusted data, and running untrusted code, because Windows basically ignores this essential concept and Android tries to solve that with sandboxing each app.

in reply to DirkMcCallahan

Yeah. The I'm A Mac crowd had the same problem... god damn it, two or three decades ago.

As market share increases, platforms become a much bigger target for malware. And a lot of the "I don't need to run virus scans" crowds learn the hard way.

Its the same with open source. Obviously NOBODY around here would parrot this bullshit, but there is the idea that because something is FOSS it is safe. Code is only as safe as code review and there have been a few high profile cases of social engineering to get malicious code past even fairly rigorous review. Let alone "Well, that script is FOSS so somebody probably reviewed it" that we see so often.

in reply to Voytrekk

in reply to pyssla

I don't know if raw package counts is the best comparison. Unlike say Fedora, Arch bundles everything related to a project in the same file. If you want Qt6-base on Arch, that is one package. If you want it on Fedora, it is going to have a lib, header, docs, and maybe a few other packages.

Just from personal experience, I do not have issues with finding packages in the main repos, with only a handful of my packages coming from the AUR. This is not the case with others, like Fedora where extra repos need to be added, like EPEL and RPM Fusion.

This entry was edited (9 months ago)
in reply to Voytrekk

in reply to Jolteon

Absolutely.

The Arch User Repository is a way for anyone to easily distribite software.

Hence it has never been secure, and rather than claim it is, you mostly see people and documentation warn you about this, and to be careful if using it.

Any schmuck can make whatever they want available via the AUR. That's how even the tiniest niche project can often be installed via the AUR. But you trade in some security for that convenience.

in reply to Xylight‮

The affected malicious packages are:
  • librewolf-fix-bin
  • firefox-patch-bin
  • zen-browser-patched-bin


What a nice attack on privacy-friendly infrastructure.

And then, Arch AUR has such suspicious things like the Brave browser which claims to reduce tracking.... and works together with advertisers.

To be clear, AUR is fantastic if you develop some experimental package and you want to give it to your friends to try it out easily. But not as a general distribution mechanism.

This entry was edited (9 months ago)
in reply to HaraldvonBlauzahn

Sure, I guess, if you've got a distro installed on your PC and use the distro-provided packages to install the Rust compiler, then you can't be subject to such certificate MitM attacks.

Your comment sounded like you were primarily concerned about the shell script piping rather it just being a program which can be downloaded without going through distro packages.

in reply to Ephera

Your comment sounded like you were primarily concerned about the shell script piping rather it just being a program which can be downloaded without going through distro packages.


The AUR install scripts are just downloaded shell scripts which are executed (hopefully after inspection).

curl | bash just skips the inspection step - curl downloads to stdout, bash executes from stdin.

in reply to Xylight‮

We are getting to the point where inviting more people in means we will need an automated babysitter to watch for this shit and to pull it once it’s discovered. Apple has a walled garden approach that’s certainly taken a big chunk of malware threats out of their devices but their walled garden approach is ridiculous and impractical for Linux. The Microsoft method of monitoring and second guessing everything with antimalware programs is also suspect because it is super easy to abuse and resource intensive. We have clamAV but clam kinda sucks.

Linux is at the point where we need something that audits what’s going in and automatically yanks it back out remotely if it’s found to be a problem. Things can only be added by the user, but the bot can remove them without interaction of the user.

I don’t see this happening though. Instead, I see this as more of a rust vs C thing all over again, where valid critiques are drowned out by “improve your skills bro.”

in reply to Xylight‮

the firefox, zen browser and libre wolf packages are concerning. The ttf ms font too. Those are very normal apps and unless you pay attention to the package name when doing "pacman -Syu", you would fall for the malware.

If only we can compartmentalize all AUR packages. The download AUR sources iirc are already in something like $HOME/.paru. Installing is a different story, because these packages can put their executable all over the places: /usr/local/bin, $HOME/local/bin.

in reply to mazzilius_marsti

With respect, you wouldn't install these by just doing an update, so pacman -Syu is fine.

You would have needed to install these manually, or a package that depended on them - both from AUR - so you'd also need to use yay (etc) to install them.

But - I totally agree with your points that tge names look innocent enough for someone to install those over other packages.

Always look at the AUR (website) at the package details - if it's new(ish) and has 0 or 1 votes, then be suspicious.

Unknown parent

lemmy - Link to source

balsoft

It has already happened a few times with other repos. Although AUR is especially susceptible because there's no vetting at all, it's a free-for-all that everyone can publish to within a few clicks. This will for sure happen again within a couple months, but better hidden the next time.